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Abstract: 
This paper attempts to analyze China’s foreign policy in regards to the Sino-Myanmar pipeline 
project through a look at misguided uses of defensive and offensive realism. The argument of this 
paper is that in the anarchical international system, states do not seek security as defensive and 
offensive realism commonly hold. Rather, states seek to control and shape their external 
environment. First, defensive and offensive realism are briefly discussed, specifically within the 
context of the Sino-Mayanmar pipeline project. Further, it is suggested that neoclassical realism 
may be a better guide to understand the contemporary oil situation in China.  
 
Résumé : 
Ce travail tente d’analyser la politique étrangère de la Chine en ce qui a trait au projet pipeline 
Sino-Myanmar à travers d’une interprétation de l’utilisation erronée des réalismes défensif et 
offensif. L’argument de ce travail maintient qu’au sein du système international anarchique les états  
ne recherchent pas la sécurité tel qu’il est soutenu par les réalismes défensif et offensif. Les états 
cherchent plutôt à contrôler et définir leur environnement externe. D’abord, les réalismes défensif 
et offensif sont discutés brièvement dans le contexte du projet pipeline Sino-Myanmar 
spécifiquement. Plus loin, il est suggéré que le réalisme néoclassique pourrait être un meilleur 





Energy security is inevitable in China's foreign policy since China's economic growth is heavily 
dependent on imported energy resources, mainly oil. Most of the Chinese oil industry depends on 
comes from the Middle East and Africa passing by the Strait of Malacca, where it connects the 
Indian Ocean with the South China Sea. However, China fears that the United States might block 
oil flows into China through the Strait of Malacca in the event of its military action against 
Taiwan.1 China also worries that the U.S. might control the Strait of Malacca since international 
terrorists might target ships passing through the critically strategic waterway.2 The Sino-Myanmar 
pipeline project is one of China's efforts to find alternative pathways to avoid the vulnerability in 
the Strait of Malacca.3 Between defensive realism and offensive realism, where can China's 
pipeline project in Myanmar be situated as its empirical example? Can defensive realism explain it 
fully since it predicts that when nations feel threatened they will pursue military, economic, and 
diplomatic strategies to increase security?4 However, offensive realism might argue that “states 
begin with a defensive motive, but are forced to think and sometimes act offensively because of the 
structure of the international system.”5  
 The purpose of this paper is to show that both defensive realism and offensive realism are 
misguided. This is from the perspective of neoclassical realism, which can explain the Sino-
Myanmar pipeline project. The argument of this paper is that in the anarchical international system, 
states do not seek security as defensive and offensive realism commonly hold. Rather, states seek to 
control and shape their external environment. Depending on the amount of their resources or power 
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with which states can influence other states, states determine the degree of their foreign policies.6 
This paper consists of six parts. First, the paper describes briefly the debate between defensive 
realism and offensive realism. Second, it examines China's concerns on the Strait of Malacca. 
Third, it examines the backgrounds of the Sino-Myanmar pipeline project. Fourth the paper 
examines why defensive realism is misguided, followed by examining why offensive realism is 
misguided based on the Sino-Myanmar pipeline project. The paper concludes by discussing 
Myanmar's changing foreign policy toward China.  
 
Defensive realism vs. Offensive realism 
As theories of foreign policy which deals with a particular state and its motivations, policies, and 
behaviour with respect to international affairs,7  both defensive realism and offensive realism, as 
Rose argues, derive from the common assumption that “the international system is anarchic nature 
and states are motivated by a desire for security.”8 Similarly, Kirshner argues “virtually all realists 
share the view that fear - alertness to the dangers of the world - is a primal motive of behaviour, 
and that security is a principal and urgent desire.”9 However, the two branches disagree with 
respect to the logical implications of anarchy.  
 Defensive realism holds that international anarchy is not as malignant as generally assumed, 
that is that “security is often plentiful rather than scarce and that rational states pursuing security 
can often afford to be relaxed, only responding to external threats, which are rare.”10 In the 
defensive realists’ world, international anarchy provides incentives for expansion only under 
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 Offensive realism, in contrast, holds that international anarchy is generally Hobbesian; 
security is scarce and states try to achieve it by maximizing their relative advantage.12  
Mearsheimer argues that states, motivated to ensure their own security, will recognize that the 
safest position in the system is “one of regional hegemony.”13 In regard to the rise of China, for 
example, Mearsheimer argues that “a powerful China will seek to dominate Asia the way the 
United States dominates the western hemisphere” and urges the US “to reverse course and do what 
it can to slow the rise of China.”14 For offensive realists, anarchy provides strong incentives for 
expansion and all states strive to maximize their power because only the most powerful states can 
guarantee their survival.15 In the offensive realists world, rational states pursuing security are liable 
to take actions that can lead to conflict with others.16 Mearsheimer concludes, “China cannot rise 
peacefully”; as its capabilities increase, China will become “an aggressive state determined to 
achieve regional hegemony.”17 Whether China's pipeline project is derived from its ambitious 
desire to be regional hegemony or for preparing for a rainy day will be discussed in the next 
section. 
 
China's concerns with the Strait of Malacca 
Eighty per cent of China's oil imports pass through the Strait of Malacca.18 As Shaofeng describes, 
in every respect can the Strait of Malacca be regarded as “a life line of the rising dragon,” 
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therefore, any disruption or blockade on the Strait of Malacca, either by groups or by nation states, 
will definitely interrupt China's economic growth.19 Shaofeng describes China's three major 
concerns.20 
 The first concern is ongoing piracy incidents. In the 1980s and 1990s, the yearly reported 
piracy incidents in Southeast Asian waters were below sixty, but there were 1220 (one thousand 
two hundred and twenty) actual and attempted attacks over 1999 to 2005.21 As a result, Southeast 
Asia was regarded as one of the world's two most frequent scenes of pirate attacks against seaborne 
vessels, and the Strait of Malacca is frequently troubled by piracy attacks, just next to Indonesia.22  
Despite the three littoral states in the Strait of Malacca, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, have 
launched coordinated patrols and brought the piracy attacks down; possibilities of pirate attacks 
can hardly be deterred.23  
 Maritime terrorism is another concern with China's increasing reliance on seaborne 
shipments. However, the seriousness of this problem is interpreted differently among countries. 
Countries like the U.S. and Singapore tend to highlight the vulnerability of the Strait of Malacca to 
terrorist attacks, claiming that the threat of terrorist attacks have increased since September 11th 
2001.24 However, Indonesia and Malaysia believe that some countries including the U.S. use the 
greater risk of terrorist attacks in the Strait of Malacca as an excuse to control the economically 
strategic waterway.25 China has fears that international terrorists might target ships passing through 
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the Strait of Malacca and the U.S might control the waterway.26     
 
 
 The third concern, and probably the deepest one, rests with the U.S.' active presence in the 
Asian Pacific waters.27 In the eyes of some Chinese strategic analysts, the Strait of Malacca is 
crucial for the U.S. “to gain geopolitical preeminence, check the rise of China and other powers, 
and control the flow of world energy.”28 China particularly worries that the U.S. might obstruct 
seaborne oil flows into China in the event of its military action against Taiwan.29 China also holds 
that the U.S. would make use of its presence in the strategic Strait of Malacca to halt the People's 
Liberation Army Navy to go to blue waters, a precondition for its rise as a world power.30 This 
raises the question of what the probability is for the U.S. to interrupt China's oil imports. 
 Many Chinese analysts believe that an oil blockade by the U.S. would be highly unfeasible 
because of questionable legality in international law while Chinese military analysts and energy 
experts are “nearly unanimous” in their conclusion that a U.S. blockade of China's oil imports 
would be tantamount to war.31  
 The U.S. oil blockade may remote, yet the psychological impact of its very possibility is 
often far greater than physical consequence.32  Much of this anxiety stems from the belief that 
China's economy cannot tolerate a substantial disruption to its oil supply and this belief has led the 
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Chinese government to a global search for alternative pathways.33 Zhao argues that China needs to 
place a high priority on getting “as much future oil and gas as possible from as close as home as 
possible.”34 The Sino-Myanmar pipeline project will open a fourth route for China's oil and natural 
gas imports, after ocean shipping via the Strait of Malacca, the Sino-Kazakhstan crude oil and 
natural gas pipelines, and the Sino-Russian oil pipeline.35 
 
Sino-Myanmar Pipeline Project: origin, expectations, and challenges 
This section begins with explaining the origin of the pipeline proposal because it was not China 
who approached Myanmar first. India's gas pipeline was proposed before China's approach and 
Myanmar dramatically switched its decision to make pipelines with China from India.36 This is 
important in order to understand how national interests or decision makers' calculations on those 
interests impact on a country's foreign policy in international relations.  
 In late 2003, a consortium of South Korean and Indian companies led by Daewoo 
International discovered substantial reserves of natural gas in three gas fields - Shwe, Shwe Phyu 
and Mya - located off the Myanmar city of Sittwe in the Gulf of Bengal and it was thought that 
India would be granted exclusive buying rights over the Shwe gas fields.37  In January 2005, in a 
trilateral meeting, India, Bangladesh and Myanmar agreed to transport natural gas from Myanmar 
to India by pipeline transiting through Bangladesh.38 India's domestic energy priorities led to a 
close Indo-Myanmar relationship regardless of “great power disapproval” such as the United States 
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and the United Kingdom, and India's proposed gas pipeline with Myanmar through Bangladesh 
was of particular interest.39 India's effort to have good relations with Myanmar aimed not only for 
energy security for its economic growth but also its opening up the trade with Myanmar which 
would enhance India's relations with the rest of Southeast Asia.40 
 However, the Bangladesh government's demands on India hold the Indo-Myanmar pipeline 
project and in late 2005, eventually, China's state owned the company, PetroChina, signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with State owned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise.41 This 
allowed China, who came late for the project, to have purchasing rights of gas from the Shwe fields 
on the basis that it would be exported to Yunnan Province in China through a pipeline.42 In late 
2008 the consortium led by Daewoo who owns fifty one per cent of the equity stakes in the three 
gas fields finally agreed to grant exclusive purchasing rights of the Shwe gas to China for a period 
of thirty years.43  
 Through all those dramatic events, finally in June 2009, a MoU between China and 
Myanmar on the construction of the Sino-Myanmar oil pipeline to be laid next to the gas pipeline 
was signed44 and the construction of pipelines was officially launched in 2010 and is expected to be 
in operation in 2013.45 China is responsible for the construction and operation of the pipelines 
while Myanmar will provide security for the pipelines.46 In addition to financing the construction 
of pipelines and pipeline related facilities, China will pay Myanmar a sizable transit fee (about one 
billion or more in annual revenue), which will generate stable source of income for Myanmar's 
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government over 30 years.47  
 It is commonly held that the Sino-Myanmar pipelines, once operational, would eliminate 
Chinese reliance on present Malacca Strait enhancing China's oil supply security, and would create 
a transport reduction to China's southern coast.48 However, given that the pipeline will only deliver 
ten per cent of China's current oil imports,49 its impact is likely to be marginal, meaning the 
reliance on the Strait of Malacca are still likely to be continued.50 Moreover, the Sino-Myanmar 
pipeline project would come at a high cost since pipeline related facilities, such as transport 
infrastructure, a deep-water crude oil serving dock, and an oil storage facility, have to be built 
along with pipelines.51 Aside from the high cost of building, there are some challenges that the 
Sino-Myanmar pipelines might face. Firstly, the pipelines have to travel across a set of complex 
and diverse terrains, including transverse mountains, surging rivers, virgin forest, and parts of 
Yunnan province that are prone to landslides, erosions, and mudflows.52   
 Secondly, the pipeline route passes close to areas controlled by ethnic militias in the 
northern Shan state bordering China.53 There have been continuous conflicts between these 
opposition groups and the Myanmar government. The Sino-Myanmar pipelines could be 
endangered by civil conflict in Myanmar.54 Thirdly, there is increasing resentment towards Chinese 
businessmen among local Myanmar people. Local people complain that there are no job 
opportunities for them and land use is not properly compensated.55 However, Chinese companies 
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say they could not find enough qualified local workers to get involved in the pipeline project.56 The 
local people's discontent might lead to an attack or disruption on the Sino-Myanmar pipelines. 
 In sum, China's effort to deliver oil to Yunnan province through a pipeline passing by 
Myanmar seems not to immune to the similar risks as those of oil ships passing by the Strait of 
Malacca. China's oil security might be still under uncertainties. This raises the question of what 
China’s ultimate objective is from the Sino-Myanmar pipeline project if it is not for oil security. 
Which international relations theory can explain this? 
Why defensive realism is misguided 
Defensive realism predicts that when nations feel threatened they will pursue economic, 
diplomatic, and military strategies to increase security.57 According to this analysis, the Sino-
Myanmar pipeline project can be understood as China's search for oil security because China fears 
an oil disruption by the U.S. (as the deepest concern) given that there is no overarching authority to 
prevent the U.S. from using violence or the threat of violence to disrupt China's oil shipments 
passing by the Strait of Malacca. However, from a neoclassical realist perspective, defensive 
realism is misguided because it emphasizes countries' responses to threats and overlooks the fact 
that one's perceptions of threat are partly shaped by “one's relative material power with which 
states can influence each other.”58 How much does China feel threatened by the U.S.? China, as an 
emerging great power, is notably an important strategic rival of, and economically with, the U.S.59 
 China, first of all, is one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States). Each member of the 
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Security Council holds a veto power, which can be exercised unilaterally. In other words, any 
permanent member alone can block any resolution. For example, China used a veto power to 
protect Myanmar whenever the U.N. Security Council, which includes the U.S., tried to impose 
sanctions on Myanmar for its violations of human rights and want of political reforms.60 Second, 
China's massive dollar holdings are a key pillar of support for the stability of the U.S. dollar.61 
Finally, China's possession of nuclear weapons is another aspect to be considered when it comes to 
China's perception of threat.  
 Given that China has capabilities or resources with which it can influence the U.S., China's 
perceived threat would be marginal compared to the one of those states, which does not have as 
much political or economic power as China. China's fear of an oil blockade by the U.S. on the 
Strait of Malacca would remote its possibility.62 More importantly, given that China's effort to seek 
oil security through the Sino-Myanmar pipelines might be interrupted by opposition groups or local 
people in Myanmar, defensive realism seems to be insufficient to explain full range of state 
behaviour with respect to international affairs. 
 
Why offensive realism is misguided  
The distinction between defensive and offensive realism is a distinction with respect to whether 
states maximize security or power.63 All of the scholars with the latter camp argue that states 
maximize power in order to achieve the primary goals that states seek; survival and security, and 
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further contend that states tend towards aggressive policies that can lead to conflict with others.64 
According to this view, China's action in Myanmar is a part of the effort to be the most powerful 
state in the system to ensure its survival and it might lead to conflict with other states; possibly 
with the U.S.  
China benefits immensely from its ability to access the American market.65 Besides, as 
Kirshner describes, China lives in “a very crowded neighborhood” in which  it «is extremely 
unlikely to achieve regional hegemony.”66 China shares a long border with Russia, which has a 
very large nuclear force. China borders India, which is also a nuclear armed state and has a latent 
economic potential similar even to that of China. Japan is also very close by. Japan, which is a 
strong ally of the U.S., if frightened or provoked, has the capacity  to develop an independent 
nuclear force. Nuclear-capable North Korea would be another regional player sharing a border with 
China.67 In sum, there is no reason to believe that if China were a rational actor motivated 
primarily to survive, it would embark upon a bid for hegemony.68 
 For offensive realists, domestic differences between countries are considered to be 
relatively unimportant, because pressures from the international system are assumed to be strong 
and straightforward enough to make similarly situated states behave alike, regardless of their 
internal characteristics.69 However, this view is misguided, from a neoclassical realist perspective 
because to understand the way states interpret and respond to their external environment, one must 
analyze how systemic pressures are translated through unit-level intervening variables such as 
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decision-makers' perception and domestic state structure.70  
 In an example of the Sino-Myanmar pipeline project, one of China's interests in Myanmar is 
to develop its western provinces, especially landlocked Yunnan and Sichuan, which lagged behind 
from China's economic boom.71 Security concerns of China, in relation to Myanmar, are the flow 
of drugs, cross border human trafficking and a growing HIV/AIDS epidemic. Yunnan province is 
the most affected by these concerns.72 As examined above, what has led defensive and offensive 
realism misguided is the common assumption between defensive and offensive realism that states 
seek security under anarchy. In the following section, I will show how the Sino-Mayanmar pipeline 
project can be explained differently. 
 
The Sino-Myanmar Pipeline Project: oil security or something else? 
Instead of assuming that states seek security, neoclassical realists assume that states respond to the 
uncertainties of international anarchy by seeking to control and shape their external environment.73 
For neoclassical realists, “states are likely to want more rather than less external influence and 
pursue such influence to the extent that they are able to do so.”74 From a regional perspective, the 
Sino-Myanmar pipeline project is expected to enhance energy cooperation between China and 
Southeast Asia.75 Southeast Asia is richer in natural gas than in oil. As for individual countries, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei are the main gas exporters among Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) countries. In 2002, ASEAN member states adapted the ASEAN MoU on the 
Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP). Since then, several regional gas pipelines have been 
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completed and several more are in the process of design and construction.76 Full interconnection of 
these pipelines would see “the creation of an interconnected gas grid” and increasing gas trade 
throughout ASEAN countries.77 Given the ambitious magnitude of the Trans-ASEAN gas pipeline 
and the Sino-Myanmar pipelines, it is possible that the network would connect with gas markets in 
China, Japan, and India, making it the largest pipeline network in the world.78 
 In addition to the oil and gas trade, China's increasing investment in oil and gas exploration 
and production in Myanmar and other Southeast Asian countries is another important aspect of 
China-ASEAN energy cooperation. In fact, in 2004, Indonesia expressed that it would further 
strengthen energy cooperation with China.79 Given the importance of Southeast Asia in China's oil 
and gas supply, the level of oil and gas cooperation between China and other ten ASEAN countries 
is much higher and important than that between China and Myanmar.80 In sum, for China, the Sino-
Myanmar pipeline is a “catalyst for China-ASEAN cooperation.”81 China's desire to influence its 
external environment and its economic power to able to do so seem to follow neoclassical realists' 
line of explaining why a state behaves in a particular way. 
 Another importance of Myanmar for China is its strategic location. Myanmar is a doorway 
to the Indian Ocean and South Asia for China.82 Financing the pipeline construction would limit the 
influence other countries might have on Myanmar and turn to the country into a strategic buffer 
zone.83 Since China established a closer relationship with Myanmar after military suppression of 
                                                 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., 97. 
78 Patricia Ohli, “Trans-Asian gas network could cost $66 billion, Pipeline&Gas Journal, 221, no. 8 (1994): 1-2, 
quoted in Zhao, “China and Myanmar,” 97. 
79 Zhao, “China and Myanmar,” 97. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid., 94. 
82 Panwar, “India and China,” 10. 




pro-democracy movement in 1988, China has contributed greatly to regime survival. China aided 
Myanmar with massive arms supply and, in return, Myanmar gave China opportunity to afford 
control over the Strait of Malacca.84 China modernized Myanmar’s naval facilities in the Bay of 
Bengal, aiming to constrain and contain Indian and U.S. naval ambitions through direct monitoring 
in Bay of Bengal.85   
 
Conclusion 
Although India failed in the competition with China for the pipelines, its energy cooperation with 
Myanmar is in continuation. India holds shares in the Sino-Myanmar pipeline project and is 
negotiating with Myanmar on building further oil and gas pipelines to western and eastern India.86 
The fact that the Myanmar government allowed Indian energy companies to be involved in its 
China-bound pipelines suggests that Myanmar has no intention of being subject to any foreign 
power.87 Rather than seeking security by tilting toward either China or India, Myanmar wants to 
shape the magnitude of its foreign policy to the extent that its strategic location and its possession 
of vital energy resources allow the country to do so. 
 Zhao describes how the external environment changes have led Myanmar's foreign policy 
gradually change, especially in its relations with China.88 For example, Myanmar has expressed its 
support for India to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council; Myanmar has 
improved its relations with the U.S. and its allies, and is ready to accept Western capital; its leaders 
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suspended the construction of a China-backed dam, which was a complete surprise to China.89 All 
this raises serious challenges to China's relationship with Myanmar in coming decades. 
Neoclassical realism might be a guide, again, to explain all the dynamic events that Myanmar 
might generate dealing with China. Neoclassical realism holds that “as their relative power rises 
states will seek more influence abroad, and as it falls their actions and ambitions will be scaled 
back accordingly.”90 
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